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Defense Launch: A Key Dmenslon of the Promse of Space Introddction "The full dzmenszons of the promzse of space are now beyond tlze scope of our knowledge and our zmagrnatzon
To presume that we have more now than merely a ghmpse of those dlmensrons would be both a vain ar,d perhaps uZtzmateZy, a fatally llmztzng error M Lyndon Johnson saw much promise m the U S space program m its early years. As President, he followed the agenda set by his munediate predecessors, Presidents Kennedy and Eisenhower; their long-term leadership is one of the malor reasons why the space program is robust today Space continues to offer promise m fulfillment of mihtary, civil and commercial aims but a malor limitation on our future capability to exploit its dimensions is an agmg launch system
The 1995 National Military Strategy prepared by the Chairman, Jomt Chiefs of Staff (JCS), describes how space systems are required as "enhancements" to military power usmg reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, navigation, weather and other capabilmes The JCS envisions a growing role for these systems and this vision 1s a strength of the Strate,v But a malor weakness is that modernization "will be pursued only where there is substantial payoff" (NMS, 111)
The need to make a malor investment m future space launch capabilities is at the heart of a much larger debate withm the Department of Defense on the proper priority for force modernization versus readmess and force structure It is an issue ' Excerpted from a report cm the actlr'ltles of the Second Session of the 85th Congress, dellvered by Lyndon Johnson on the floor of the Senate on August 23,1958 . that culs across the military Services, the Jomt level, and affects a wide range of strategic and tactical systems. Readiness and force structure are current priorities 2 that support our military strategy of "flexible and selective engagement" and that enable the United States to answer calls to the Nation's global responsibilmes m the post-Cold War era The Strategy remforces the conventional wisdom that these responsibihties are so vast and so important that they are lustified m consummg the malority of resources m a smaller and still shrmkmg Defense budget. The issue to be confronted later is that few resources are left over for meeting tomorrow's responsibilities
The Clinton Admmistration's National Space Transportation Pohcy favors the readmess and force structure side of the debate The Pohcy includes a hedge to "evolve" the malor systems mto a new family of launchers while NASA carries out long-term research and development on a new reusable system The program, aimed at lowermg costs per launch and improvmg efficiency of heavy launch n-t particular, amounts to a postponement of the longer term need Thus paper describes the risk of tlus strategy to our future capabilities It future launch program
We have the mformation that we need to make good choices because the Government and mdustry have already devoted considerable attention to their study. What we need now is strong leadership--such as LBJ provided to the space program decades ago--that will enable us to depart from convenfional wisdom and sustam a long-term commitment to the Nations's new goals for"rehable and affordable access " to space The question of future space launch is m essence a question of leadership
National Military Strategy Establishes the Need for Space Systems and Launch
The 1995 National Military Strate,y (NMS) includes space systems as "force building enhancements" Accordmg to the Strategy, "Peacetime engagement, deterrence and confhct prevention, and fightmg and wmnmg our Nation's wars" are the three tasks that our military forces must perform It rests on the "strategic concepts" of overseas presence and power prolecnon (p i), that rely upon "force buildmg foundations" of quahty people, readmess, enhancements, modernization and force balance (p 18-19) Battlefield surveillance, global command and control and the ability to employ precision weapons are among the enhancements upon which the Strategy depends
The role of space systems is likely to grow The former Vice Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral W&am Owens, called space systems one of the "emergmg mstruments of national mihtary power" (Strategic Assessment, X35-193) According to Admiral Owens, an important step toward achievmg our military oblectives will be to combme three mayor systems that to date have operated mostly mdependently of each other--battlespace awareness, C3, and those that support preclslon apphcatlon of force--Into one mtegrated system Tndlvldually, these systems are hkely to
Increase effectiveness of US military forces as they reach maturity Collectively, they will 'I.. permrt U S. armed forces to see and respond to every mlhtarlly relevant object wlthm a notlonal theater of operations--a cube of 200 nautical miles on a side
With the 'system of systems,' the mlhtary ~111 be able to engage m parallel warfare;
that IS, simultaneous strikes carried out with high precision against targets m widely separated locations " The EELV concept originated m a 1994 DOD "Space Launch Modemlzatlon
Plan" study I1 The study's premise was that space transportation was unreliable and too cosjly DOD was spending about $19 bllllon per year for space launch servlces--'Tlus 1s an Esue that DOD has studied for some tune There 1s some consents that excess ICBMs may be \ aluable resources for either conventional warhead delivery or for space launch There 1s IW poht~al consensus that they should be used m this fasluon l*Fanuharly known as the "Moorman Study" after Air Force General Thomas Moorman, who headed a study team, this study was prepared m response to a mandate m the 1994 Defense Authorization Act The report built on previous studies, mcludmg the 1990 Augustme Report, the 1992 Aldrldge study, DOD'S "Bottom-Up Review" m 1993, and NASA's "Access to Space Study" "'Remforcmg this IS the DOD acquwbon mmdset that emphasizes performance over cost (Sutton, 138) It 1s a slgruflcant tradeoff to allow the exlgencles, or perceived exlgencles, of engmeermg to interfere with the economic needs This has directed attention to the cost of operations and support and how launch vehicle and payload designs interact Launch prices are not the only malor cost Another factor 1s the cost of launch as a function of total cost of space systems That 1s to say, it costs much, much more to build a spacecraft than to pay for its launch to orbit, and unless spacecraft costs are reduced, even dramatic reductions m launch costs will have only a small effect on total program costs (OTA-BP-ISC-60, 1) In add&on to satellites and launch, costs for storage and preparation for launch, ground station receive and tracking equipment, and on-orbit costs are hgh l5 It 1s because the total system costs are extraordmarlly high that every launch 1s a critical one In general, the Government's aims for the launch mdustrial base fits within this broader set of auns It is a complex case study that has received much attention m recent years.l' But the U S. launch mdustry is shaped by the fact that the U S Government is the largest customer for its products and services and some mdustry officials believe that the Government demand is msufficient to sustain some parts "There are additional factors from diverse sources that are mfluencmg the future complexion of the mdustrlal base knong these are growmg levels of mdustrlal reglonahzatlon and globahzatlon, and the mterdependence among nations and firms wlthm mdustnes regardless of nationality, the abundance of cheap labor overseas, the shortenmg of the technology life cycle, whether reliance upon exhaustible resources such as 011 will contmue, ecology, and others (Foster, (133) (134) lgIndeed, there are many recent studies QI this large sublect See DOD s "Industrial Assessment for Space Launch Vehicles" (January 1995) and the "Space Launch Modemlzatlon Study" (1994), the Vice (1995:) of the mdustry over the long run (OTA-ISS-620,24) A further area of concern is whether the United States should invest m a commercial launch mdustry to sustain an mdustrial base if the systems produced by it are prmcipally designed to support Government needs If it is redesigned to support commercial needs, there is concern as to whether the commercial, Defense and non-Defense Government needs will compete for resources wrthm that system. As noted above, the future demand for commercial launch is uncertain, the mvestment is large and the risks are high Another school of thought says that the Government demand for launch is large and important enough to sustam a viable launch industry (OTA, 24)
The NSTP specifies that the Government will want to make the development and operation of new launchers more affordable (whether the launch mdustry is eventually restructured to support the Government or whether it supports both Government and commercial interests) As important as reducing costs may be, there is, however, a more important goal that the Government should seek The goal should be to achieve "unity of effort" [Foster, 136) that there is no lomt space doctrine and they argue that the doctrine is needed so as to " . ..provide priorities by offering a coherent vision for employmg space forces that significantly enhances national security Clear goals will help m determmmg the requisite tools (force structure and equipment) for this task (p 72) " Also, as noted above, the combmation of operational efficiency and dynamic application of doctrme, force structure, technology, trammg and other factors is powerful when they come together on the battlefield We need to plan now to take maximum advantage of space systems as mstruments of military power
Conclusion
The 1995 We now have a clearer understanding of the drmenslons of space of which Lyndon Johnson spoke almost forty years ago At that time his concern was that we not limit our imagmatron lest we limit the promise Now, the fatally hmltmg error would be to fall to act on our capacrty to reahze that promrse Appends 
(3
~ (6) Balance efforts to sustam and modernize existmg space transportation capabrlmes with the need to mvest in the development of improved future capabrlitles;
Mamtam a strong space transportatron capabthty and technology base, including launch systems, mfrastructure, and support facrlmes, to meet the national needs for space transport of personnel and payloads;
Promote the reduction m the cost of current space transportation systems while rmprovmg then reliabrhty, operability, responsiveness, and safety, Foster technology development and demonstration to support future decrsions on the development of next generation reusable space transportanon systems that greatly reduce the cost of access to space,
Encourage the cost-effective use of commercrally provided U.S. products and services, to the fullest extent feasible, that meet mission requirements; and
Foster the mtematronal competmveness of the U S. commercial space transportation industry, actively considering commercral needs and factormg them mto decisrons on rmprovements m launch facrlmes and launch vehicles.
This pohcy will be implemented within the overall resource and pohcy guidance provided by the President.
I. Implerrentation Guidelines
To ensure successful rmplementatron of this pohcy, US Government agencies will cooperate to take advantage of the unique capabllmes and resources of each agency.
Thrs pohcy shall be unplemented as follows:
(1) The Department of Defense (DOD) wrll be the lead agency for improvement and evolution of the current U S. expendable launch TrehrcIe (ELV) fleet, includmg appropnate technology development
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will provrde for the unprovement of the Space Shuttle system, focusmg on reliabliity, safety, and cost-effectiveness.
The Yational Aeronautics and Space Admmistration will be the lead agency for technology development and demonstratton for next generation reusable space transportation systems, such as the single-stage-to-orbit concept
The Departments of Transportation and Commerce ~111 be responsrble for rdentrfymg and promoting mnovattve types of arrangements between the U S Government and the private sector, as well as State and local governments, that may be used to implement apphcable portions of this pohcy. US Government agencies will consider, where appropriate, commmnents to the private sector, such as anchor tenancy or termmatton habrlity, commensurate wnh the benefits of such arrangements.
The Department of Defense and the National Aeronauttcs and Space Admimstration will plan for the transmon between space programs and future launch systems m a manner that ensures contmuny of missron capability and accommodates transmon costs.
The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Admimstratron \v111 combine then expendable launch servrce requirements mto smgle procurements when such procurements would result m cost savings or are otherwrse advantageous to the Government A Memorandum of Agreement will be developed by the Agencies to carry out this pohcy.
II National Security Snace Transportanon Guldelmes
(1) The Department of Defense will be the launch agent for the national security sector and ~111 mamtam the capabrhty to evolve and operate those space transportation systems, mfrastructure, and support acnvmes necessary to meet national security requirements :a
The Department of Defense will be the lead agency for rmprovement and evolution of the current expendable launch vehicle fleet, mcludmg appropriate technology development All slgmficant ELV technology-related development associated with medium and heavy-hft ELVs will be accomplished through the DOD. In coordmatlon wrth the DOD, SASA ~111 contmue to be responsible for implementmg changes necessary to meet its mission-umque requrrements.
(3) The oblectrve of DOD'S effort to improve and evolve current ELVs is to reduce costs while improvmg rehabrhty, operability, responsiveness, and safety. Consistent with missron requrrements, the DOD, 111 cooperation with the crvll and commercial sector, should evolve satellite, payload, and launch vehicle designs to achieve the most cost-effective and affordable integrated satellite, payload, and launch vehicle combinatton.
(a> ELV improvements and evolution plans will be unplemented in cooperation with the Intelligence Commumty, the National Aeronautrcs and Space Administration and the Departments of Transportatron and Commerce, taking mto account, as appropnate, the needs of the commercial space launch sector (b) The Department of Defense will mamtain the Trtan IV launch system until a replacement 1s available.
(4) The Department of Defense, m cooperation with NASA, may use the Space Shuttle to meet national secunty needs. Launch pnonty ~111 be provided for national security missrons as governed by appropriate NASA/DOD agreements. Launches necessary to preserve and protect human life m space shail have the highest pnonty except in times of national emergency. L (5) Protection of space transportanon capabrlitres employed for national security purposes wilI be pursued commensurate with their planned use m crisis and conflict and the threat. Civil and commercial space transportation capabrlrties identrfied as critical to national security may be modrfied at the expense of the requesting agency or department. To the maximum extent possible, these systems, when modrfled, should retain therr normal operational utility.
III. Civil Snace Transnortation Guidelines
(1) The h'attonal Aeronautics and Space Admimstratron wrll conduct human space flight to exploit the unique capabilities and attributes of human access to space. NASA will continue to mamtain the capability to operate the Space Shuttle fleet and associated facilities.
(a)
GO
The Space Shuttle will be used only for missions that requires human presence or other unique Shuttle capabrlities, or where use of the Shuttle 1s determined to be important for national securrty, foreign policy or other compelling purposes.
The National Aeronautrcs and Space Admmistratron will mamtain the Space Shuttle system until a replacement is available.
(2) (c) As future development of a new reusable launch system IS antrapated, procurement of additional Space Shuttle orbiters LS not planned at this time.
The National Aeronauucs and Space Admimstration ~111 be the lead agency for technology development and demonstration of next generation reusable space transportation systems.
The objective of NASA's technology development and demonstration effort is to support government and prrvate sector decrsrons by the end of thus decade on development of an operational next-generation reusable launch system.
Research shall be focused on technologres to support a decision no later than December 1996 to proceed with a sub-scale flight demonstration which would prove the concept of single-stage-to-orb& Technology development and demonstration, mcludmg operatronal concepts, wrI1 be implemented in cooperation with related activities 111 the Department of Defense.
It is envisioned that the private sector could have a sigmficant role m managing the development and operation of a new reusable space transportation system. In anticipation of this role, KASA shall actrvely mvolve the private sector in plannmg and evaluating its launch technology activities.
IV. Commclal Space Transpottatron Guidelmes
(1) The United States Government is committed to encouraging a viable commercral U.S. space transportanon industry.
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The Departments of Transportation and Commerce will be responsible for identrfying and promoting mnovatlve types of arrangements between the U.S. Government and the pnvate sector, as well as State and local govemments, that may be used to implement applicable portions of this policy. U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercrally available U.S. space transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible that meet mission requirements and shall not conduct activmes with commercial application that preclude or deter commercral space actlvmes, except for national security or public safety reasons
The U.S. Government will provide for the tamely transfer to the private sector of unclassified Government-developed space transportation technologies m such a manner as to protect then commercial value.
The U S. Government will make all reasonable efforts to provide stable and predictable access to appropriate space transportation-related hardware, facllines, and services, these will be on a reimbursable baas. The U S. Government reserves the nght to use such faclhties and services on a priority basis to meet national security and critical crv11 sector mission requirements.
(0 U.S. Government agencies shall work with the U.S. commercral space sector to promote the establrshment of techmcal standards for commercial space products and services.
U.S. Government agencies, in acquiring space launch-related capabilities, will, to the extent feasible and consistent with mission requirements: GO Involve the private sector in the design and development of space transportation capabilities and encourage private sector financmg, as appropriate.
0.9
Emphasize procurement strategies that are based on the use of commercial U.S. space transportanon products and services.
(cl Provide for private sector retention of technical data nghts, llmlted only to the extent necessary to meet government needs. (1) A long term goal of the Umtecl States 1s to achieve free and farr trade. In pursuit of this goal, the U.S. Government wrll seek to negotiate and rmplement agreements with other nations that define principles of free and fan trade for commercial space launch services, limit certain government supports and unfarr practices in the international market, and establish cntena regarding p%trcipatron by space launch industries m countries in transitron from a non-market to a market economy.
(a) Intematronal space launch trade agreements m which the U.S. is a party must allow for effective means of enforcement. The range of options avarlable to the U.S. must be sufficient to deter and, if necessary, respond to non-compliance and provide effective relief to the U.S. commercial space launch industry. Agreements must not constrain the ability of the United States to take any action consistent with U.S. laws and regulations. (a) This pohcy does not apply to use of foreign launch vehicles on a no-exchange-of-funds basis to support the following: flight of scientific instruments on foreign spacecraft, international scientific programs, or other cooperative government-to-government programs Such use will be sublect to interagency coordination procedures.
The U.S. Government will seek to take advantage of foreign components or technologres in upgradmg U.S. space transportation systems or developmg next generation space transportation systems. Such activities will be consistent wrth U.S. nonprolrferation, national security, and foreign pohcy goals and commitments as well as the commercial sector guidelines contamed in this pohcy. They will also be conducted in a manner consistent wnh U.S. obligatrons under the MTCR and with due consideration given to dependence on foreign sources and national security.
VII. Use of U.S. Excess Ballistic Missile Assets
(1) U.S. excess ballistic mrssrle assets that will be ehminated under the START agreements shall either be retamed for government use or be destroyed. These assets may be used withm the U.S. Government in accordance with established DOD procedures, for any purpose except to launch payloads mto orbit. Requests from wrth the Department of Defense or from other U S. Government agencies to use these assets for launching payloads mto orbrt will be considered by DOD on a case-by-case basis and require approval by the Secretary of Defense.
Mmdful of the policy's guidance that U.S. Government agencies shall purchase commercrally available U.S. Space transportation products and services to the fullest extent feasible, use of excess balhstrc mrsslle assets may be permitted for launchmg payloads into orbit when the followmg condition are met (a) The payload supports the sponsonng agency's mission.
0)
The use of excess balhstrc missile assets IS consistent with international obligations, including the MTCR guidelines and the START agreements.
(cl The sponsoring agency must certify the use of excess balhstic mrssrle assets results m a cost savmgs to the U S. Government relative to the use of available commercial launch services that would also meet rrnssron requirements, includmg performance, schedule, and risk. The Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and the Admmistrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Admmrstration, with appropnate input from the Director of Central Intelhgence, wrll provide a report that will include a common set of requirements and a coordinated technology plan that addresses the needs of the national security, crvrlian, and commercial space launch sectors.
Th:: Secretary of Defense, with the support of other agencies as reqmred, wrll provide an implementation plan that includes schedule and fundmg for improvement and evolution of the current U.S. ELV fleet (cl
Cd)
The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Admmistratlon, with the support of other agencies as requrred, will provide an rmplementatron plan that includes schedule and funding for rmprovements of the Space Shuttle system and technolo,oy development and demonstration for next generation reusable space transportation systems.
The Secretaries of Transportation and Commerce, with the support of other agencies as required and U S. industry, will provide an implementatron plan that wrll focus on measures to foster an internationally competitive U S. launch capability. In addition, the Secretaries ~111 provide recommendatrons to the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautrcs and Space Administration that promote the full involvement of the commercial sector in the NASA and DOD plans.
